leading elements in the Settlement were the questions of foreign intervention by the Powers and United States policy.

The following is an attempt to analyze the opposing elements in this struggle and to throw light on the metamorphosis which occured in Powell's thinking.

a. The Shanghai Scene.

In many ways, Shanghai makes an appropriate locale for examining the evolution of Powell's thought. The International Settlement provides a microcosm for the emerging conflict between Chinese nationalist demands and the position of the foreigner in China. It also provides a study of the cleavages which developed within the foreign community itself as Chinese nationalism gained momentum within a cloak of overt anti-foreigism.

Indeed, the May 30 (1925) Incident in Shanghai intensified the nationwide nationalist storm. Here, too, was epitomized the position and various interests of the foreigner, while it symbolized to "Young China" all that was objectionable and distasteful. The International Settlement offended Chinese nationalist sentiment throughout China as an onerous example of foreign control over Chinese territory and resources. Moreover, it rubbed against the feelings of Chinese in Shanghai because of its policy of exclusive foreign administrative and legislative control over the Settlement.

The elements of Shanghai's foreign community with whom Powell eventually came into conflict cannot be dissected along either national or professional lines. Rather, the American editor finally clashed with the vested interests of a socio-political-economic order built into and around the treaty port system for nearly three generations and which closely approximated a culture unto itself. It is true that at the core of these interests stood the business community which was

predominantly British in nationality. But the forces of tradition which stood opposed to any change in the established structure by no means included all of Shanghai's foreign businessmen nor all its English residents. Its common denominator was far more complex. It constituted what Powell liked to refer to as the "Shanghai mind." Foreign residents assumed that they could either continue to obtain privileges or at least maintain the status quo which operated in their favor. In time past, quarrels with their Chinese hosts had successfully been resolved by the dispatch of a naval force up the Yangtze or merely by the presentation of written demands. Concessions were seen as a weakness which could only lead to a loss of foreign interests, a reduction of Western influence and, after the early 1920's, their replacement by the Soviet Union. Indeed, at the height of the Nationalists' Northern Expedition in 1926-27, the protection of Shanghai "at all costs" was regarded as a last-ditch stand in defense of the treaty position of the foreigner.

The Nationalist revolution from the outlook of these so-called Shanghai "die-hards" was at best a state of disorder and meaningless confusion unconnected with any more profound changes in China. At worst it was seen as a Soviet-inspired and communist-run plot. In either case it was to be treated merely as another issue in the power politics of the West. The Chinese were generally looked upon with disillusionment due to their inability to achieve internal stability and with disdain as racial inferiors understanding only the use of force.

These foreign elements reflected a habit of mind inherited from the long years in which the Treaty Powers and their resident nationals were accustomed to exercising special prerogatives in China. Together with this had grown, within the safe confines of their privileged sanctuaries, a system of institutions and way of life which incorporated much of what was familiar in their home countries with certain hybrid products of their Chinese

circumstances. They were far removed from contact with, and the life of, the average Chinese. The British-dominated Shanghai Municipal Council best represented the political expression of this traditional order; the American Chamber of Commerce during the tense moments of early 1927, can be said to represent the business interests. It is useful to note that the most vehement articulation of these interests came from the influential North China Daily News and Herald which, almost from the outset, engaged in a vituperative editorial war with The Review.

At the time of the May 30 affair the two most prominent issues facing Shanghai's International Settlement were the question of Chinese representation on the Shanghai Municipal Council and the return of the Shanghai Mixed Court to the Chinese. While not, strictly speaking, directly related to the broader question of Treaty Revision, these issues had long been an outstanding part of the Chinese program for a readjustment of China's relations with the Powers. Because of Shanghai's significance as the center of the financial, commercial and trade life of China, and as the foreign community and its multiple interests were by far the largest in the country, these questions inevitably assumed an international importance. [38]

Shanghai, from 1869, was divided into three separate administrative areas: the International Settlement; the French Concession which bordered it; and the Chinese city. The jurisdiction of the Settlement was invested in the Shanghai Municipal Council whose nine members were elected by the foreign taxpayers. As taxes were assessed irrespective of nationality on the basis of landholdings in the Settlement, the Chinese inhabitants who paid a considerable majority (70-80 per cent) of the taxes played no part either in the election of the Council or in the administration of the area. Efforts to rectify this anomaly prior to 1925 had met first with intransigence, then with procrastination, and ultimately

with failure. The Mixed Court, originally under the authority of a Chinese magistrate, was taken over by the Shanghai Consular Body during the 1911 revolution. It remained in foreign hands despite Chinese agitation for its return.

All of this stood exposed before the unprecedented wave of Chinese nationalism which swept over the country after the May 30 Incident. To say that Powell recognized that change and readjustment of the foreigner's status in China was imminent and that this was a fact which the "Shanghai mind" could not comprehend may be an over-simplification of the dichotomy of views which emerged in the foreign community, but it nevertheless stands at the crux of the matter.

b. Powell's Early Duality.

During 1925 and most of 1926 The Review's editorial approach to Shanghai issues had a dual personality. This manifested itself in Powell's policy toward the administration of the Settlement on the one hand and toward the numerous social questions rife in Sino-Foreign relations on the other.

Powell took a gradualist approach to the question of the Settlement's administration at this time. There were two fundamental reasons for this. First, by August of 1925 the way had been cleared for the implementation of the Washington Conference agreements to call a Conference on Tariff Revision and to investigate the extra-territoriality question.[39] Powell saw in carrying out the Washington Conference agreements the hope for conciliation and the working out of a satisfactory time-table for change which both the Chinese and the foreigner could agree upon. Secondly, Powell subscribed to the Washington Conference view that China would have to reform internally and establish a stable central government before foreign privileges could be relinquished. Chinese domestic

politics continued to be dominated by chaotic maneuvering about Peking by the contending warlords. The promise and possible future success of the Nationalist movement emanating from Canton was not yet in evidence. Therefore, Powell's formula for working out Sino-Foreign problems and for meeting the demands of Chinese nationalism stressed the need for "compromise" and "fair play" on both sides. Editorially he suggested that the "Ways and Means for Solving Chinese Problems" lay in "Chinese reforms, friendly cooperation and goodwill between Chinese and foreigners." [40]

The outstanding issue primarily concerned the addition of Chinese representatives to the Shanghai Municipal Council. Powell pursued a line of moderation and negotiation which bordered on conservatism. While accepting change as a basic premise, he sought an evolutionary transition within the traditional structure long operative in the International Settlement. He advocated incorporation of the Chinese into this established system as a first step toward complete Chinese sovereignty.

Illustrative of Powell's position was his hearty support of the Council's proposal in March, 1926 to add three Chinese representatives to the nine-member body. He also took this opportunity to speak out in unqualified terms for the surrender of the Shanghai Mixed Court to the Chinese. [41] At the same time, however, Powell joined the majority of the Council (as well as the North China Herald) in firm opposition to a defeated amendment to the resolution which sought the introduction of proportional representation based on tax payments as a basis for determining the Council's membership. This would have had the effect, in view of the fact that the great bulk of the Settlement's taxes were paid by Chinese, of reducing the foreign element on the Settlement's governing body to an inconsequential minority. This, Powell termed "madness." [42]

Powell explained his position in response to an attack by the Far Eastern Times of Peking on the Council's

rejection of the proportional representation scheme in which the Shanghai plan was termed "a farce and a snare." [43] He justified the Council's action on legal grounds and with an idealistic, if not naive, appraisal of human relations. He concluded that foreign land rights had been "legally obtained" (by the Land Regulations of 1869) and that in light of this contractual arrangement the Chinese "(had) no legal or moral right to participate in the government of Shanghai." [44] The Council's action, as Powell saw it, involved the granting of a privilege to those Chinese deemed worthy. He conceded that proportional representation may in itself be preferable, but he did not yet find the Chinese ready to exercise the responsibilities such an electoral system would impose upon them.

Powell's philosophical justification was indicative of his tendency to oversimplify human nature and his faith in man's common sense. The Times' argument that three Chinese representatives on the Council was a "farce" was to "maintain that justice depends on numbers and might and not on the spirit of fairplay of all." His solution was for all groups to treat each ohher fairly and "to make haste slowly." [45] Powell's policies at this point were not far removed from the general view held by the foreign populace. The fallacy of his approach lay in his gross misjudgment of innate human characteristics and his underestimation of the deep-seated passions held on both sides of the Settlement's borders.

Powell took a bolder course toward social problems which had arisen in Sino-Foreign contact within the Settlement. His social criticism, constant in Powell's writings throughout the entire period, was virile and uncompromising in contrast to his treatment of local governmental administration. His deep interest in human relations and his midwestern morality was reflected editorially in oft-repeated social themes. He engaged, from the beginning of the anti-foreign outbursts, in repeated tirades calling for broad-mindedness

racial intermingling and brotherhood. His polemic against those he considered guilty of possessing the so-called Shanghai mentality was vehement. Powell left no elements of the foreign community untouched in his assault on treaty port bigotry.

In the aftermath of the May 30 episode, Powell, brandishing Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick," rhetorically inquired "have the Chinese had a square deal?" [46] He thought not. He urged upon the Settlement administration a recognition of the deep-rooted causes for the Chinese outbreak and the need for reevaluation and soul-searching by "internationally-minded men." [47] During the summer of 1925 he took direct aim on the sanctity of the local political leadership. He charged it with having an aristocratic frame of mind which had caused numerous "blunders" in the past. Sharing the onus with the local officials, moreover, were the foreign diplomats and "hundreds and thousands of foreigners, merchants, bankers, professional men and missionaries." [48] Few, Powell concluded, had taken the Chinese seriously.

His most forthright stand, however, was taken on the question of racial relations in Shanghai. Many men in vital positions of responsibility, Powell asserted, were "imbued not only with racial antagonisms but also with the ancient habit of mind exemplified in the expression...the Chinese be damned." Powell attacked what he called the "pseudo-scientific and egotistical" views of the racial theorists, relying for support on the classical exposition of racial equality written by the noted anthropologist of his day, Professor Franz Boas of Columbia University. [49]

While pointing out that both China and the West had been responsible for racial snobbishness in the past, Powell found that the Chinese had just grounds for grievances in their claims of unequal treatment by the foreigner. The most obvious expression of this racial dogmatism was the exclusion of Chinese residents from

the Settlement's public parks and the rule preventing "Chinese as Chinese" from becoming members of Clubs in the treaty ports.[50] He even included in his barbs the foreign wives who "shielded" their children from learning the Chinese language and studying Chinese history and culture.[51] The editor of The Review did not limit his criticism to conditions within the Settlement alone. Editorial brickbats were hurled at incidents involving the ill-treatment of Chinese in as distant places as Cleveland, Ohio and as nearby as the French Concession across the street. In every case he vividly decried policies and attitudes based on racial superiority, whether in the personal relations of the citizens of Shanghai and elsewhere or on the broader plane of international relations.

There is evident here a chasm in Powell's writings. He lashes out against the institutional inadequacies and social prejudices of the Shanghai scene, but he fails to formulate meaningful measures to cope with the problems they present. While this breach between rhetoric and concrete alternatives is never entirely bridged in Powell's thought, the gap is narrowed. Not only is Powell moved to think in terms of more drastic and far-reaching measures in resolving these problems, but he adopts a more uncompromising and outspoken position vis-a-vis what he sees as the Shanghai "reactionaries."

c. Evaluation of the Nationalist Movement.

Fundamental to the conflict of views in the Shanghai foreign community were the various interpretations of the Nationalist movement. If it is possible to speculate that any man is capable of sensing the trend of history, J.B. Powell may perhaps be credited with such foresight. At any rate, he was in line with its general direction in China. The context and timing of his American experience had given

him a ready-made perspective for and an understanding toward many of the issues he encountered in China. Powell's earliest treatment of the May 30 Incident reflected an insight into the profundity of the forces at work and the character of change in China which was largely absent from the analyses of his foreign contemporaries.

The Review's response to the May 30 affair, in sharp contrast to the rival North China Daily News and Herald, revealed this depth of perception and placed in perspective its underlying meaning. Powell found "East and West. . . equally blameworthy for the state of affairs which leads to international 'incidents' (such as this) . . . " [52] In January, 1926, when supporting the minority opinion of a judicial inquiry into the affair, he also revealed his grasp of the depth of the changes taking place. [53] The minority report, written in a true Brandeisian manner by the only American judge on the three-man committee, explained the event in terms of a broad historical and social analysis rather than as an isolated act of violence activated by either a Chinese or foreign transgression. The majority view, backed by The Herald, limited itself to a discussion of the legal aspects of the immediate incident itself.

For Powell, the dominant factor in China during this era was an indigenous and justifiable Chinese nationalism. In advocating its validity and the necessity to make concessions to its demands, however, he did not serve as an apologist for China's internal conditions. He saw in the trouble and disorder which was rampant all about him the disintegration of an old system and its replacement by "a spirit often misdirected . . . misinformed and hopelessly exploited (but) a spirit which contains the germs for the construction of a new edifice on the ruins of the old." [54] Furhhermore, the internal situation was China's greatest problem, and Powell felt it could only be solved by the

Chinese themselves. However unfortunate it was that China must assume the responsibilities of sovereignty at a time of political crisis and social and economic instability, it was a situation which the foreigner had to make the best of by "standing aside and giving the Chinese people a free hand in working out their own destiny." [55]

Thus, at a time when most foreigners laid all the troubles in China to "Bolshevism," Powell assumed a different stance. He asserted that it was actually the Powers' hesitance and delays in carrying out the agreements of the Washington Conference and the foreigner's attitude of racial superiority which had provided the fertile ground for communist propaganda and opened the way for Soviet influence. Powell agreed that "no intelligent person . . . would dispute the fact that the Soviet Union has had much to do with the Chinese nationalist movement," but he declared in the same breath that "Bolshevism has become a very convenient term for labeling any movement with which we do not agree." [56]

While committed to certain moral and socialy ideals, a conciliatory policy towards China appeared to him as the only practical and just solution for resolving Sino-Foreign problems and the foreigner's position in China. To conciliate China, was to strengthen her so that she could combat external enemies, including the Soviet Union, as well as discharge her internal responsibilities. The only alternative, he believed, was to play into the hands of the radicals and Chinese "reds" and thereby prevent any possibility of a moderate and evolutionary change. This could also mean, he reasoned, the outright abrogation of all treaties and the deterioration of what the foreigner most wanted to preserve, trade. It is interesting to note that during the height of the tumult and uncertainty of the spring of 1927, Powell urged the American residents of Shanghai to remember their own revolutionary tradition and reminded them of the extremes of their own nationalism. Powell sought to place the